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The issues surrounding jurisdiction to review the 
conduct of judicial officers occurring prior to appointment 
to the bench constitute issues of first impression before this 
Court, Ultimate resolution of these issues necessitates not 
only a constitutional interpretation by this Court, but also 
directly impacts regulation of the judiciary, public policy 
and confidence in Utah's system of judicial administration. 
Due to the demanding and potentially far-reaching 
nature of the issues facing the Court, presentation and 
consideration of arguments in response to the generalized and 
generic assertions contained in Appellee's Brief are 
warranted. Such additional arguments are necessitated to 
refocus the Court's attention on issues obscured by Appellee's 
broad-brush treatment of important and technical issues. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Narrow Interpretation And Limitation Of The Mandates 
Of Article VIII, Section 13 Encouraged By Appellee Is 
Neither Warranted Nor Supportable. 
Appellee argues the preeminence of State Bar 
jurisdiction to review pre-appointment conduct of judges or 
justices by encouraging this Court to narrowly interpret the 
constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 13, which 
establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission. Specifically, 
Appellee argues that such provision vests the Judicial Conduct 
Commission only with "narrow authority" to investigate and 
discipline judges and justices for "official misconduct." 
(Appellee's Brief, Page 2). However, even the most casual 
reading of the constitutional language reveals that such 
unsupported assertions are nothing more than Appellee's own 
artificial interpretive restrictions on the express 
constitutional mandate. 
In pertinent part, Article VIII, Section 13 actually 
states: 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which 
shall investigate and conduct confidential hearings 
regarding complaints against any justice or judge. 
(Emphasis added; see Appendix A for full text of Article VIII, 
Section 13.) Appellee's assertion that the provision on its 
face is "narrow" or limited solely to "official misconduct" 
requires the overlooking of its actual language and the 
interlineation of Appellee's own desired reading. Appellee 
thereby presumes to supplant the language of the Utah 
Constitution with Appellee's own, ostensibly substituting its 
own judgment regarding judicial administration for that of the 
general public who selected the constitutional language by 
referendum. Such artificial jurisdictional restrictions are 
nothing more than fictitious amendments to the unequivocal 
language that the Judicial Conduct Commission has jurisdiction 
over any "complaints against any justice or judge." 
In response to such arguments, Appellant continues 
to rely upon and direct the Court's attention to the broad and 
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unequivocal language of Article VIII, Section 13 in support 
of its position that the Judicial Conduct Commission has been 
constitutionally granted preeminent jurisdiction over any 
complaint against any justice or judge. No limitation is 
contained within the Constitutional grant of authority, and 
none can therefore be justified, Appellee's attempts 
notwithstanding. 
In a further attempt to restrict jurisdiction, 
Appellee also asserts that "the Bar's broad authority to 
regulate the practice of law through the discipline of its 
members pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 takes precedence 
unless and until one of the specific grounds for the 
Commission's jurisdiction found in Article VIII, Section 13 
applies," (Appellee's Brief, Page 3.) Although Appellee 
cites no authority for such a statement, it is clear from the 
broad language and subsequent broad jurisdictional grant of 
Article VIII, Section 13, that no constitutional conflict or 
issues of precedence exist regarding the Bar's authority to 
regulate the practice of law. Judges and justices, by virtue 
of their office, do not and cannot "practice law." The Bar's 
authority and jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law, 
pursuant to the authority granted to it by this Court, is 
neither changed or threatened by their lack of authority to 
discipline judges or justices. 
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Moreover, Appellee's assertions fail to distinguish 
the jurisdictional portion of Article VIII, Section 13 from 
the requisite grounds necessary for discipline. The specific 
grounds referred to by Appellee are grounds for discipline, 
not jurisdiction. The jurisdictional language of the 
provision is found in the first sentence, which mandates that 
the Commission "investigate and conduct confidential hearings 
regarding complaints against any justice or judge." Such 
jurisdictional language is notably distinguishable and 
separate from the specified grounds for discipline. 
B. Appellee's Claim To Jurisdiction By Application Of Its 
Chronological Test Is Theoretically And Practically 
Flawed. 
Appellee asserts that any apparent conflict between 
the provisions of Article VIII, Section 13 and rules 
promulgated under the authority of Article VIII, Section 4 is 
an illusionary product of Appellant's misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the language and intent of Article VIII, 
Section 13. Appellee asserts that the root of Appellant's 
error is the failure to interpret Article VIII, Section 13 as 
granting jurisdiction to the Commission only to review "the 
conduct of judges and justices in their official, judicial 
capacity." In so arguing, Appellee misstates Appellant's 
position in order to set up a "straw man" with whom to do 
battle. Appellant argues not that Section 4 and Section 13 
of Article VIII are in conflict, but that rules promulgated 
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exception is proper due to the disability or disrepute which 
may result to the judicial office. Both the chronological 
test and the simplistic felony exception ignore important 
judicial administration policy considerations argued in 
Appellant's opening brief, and set up formulas which are 
insensitive to the situational nuances of judicial discipline. 
Appellee overlooks the fact that its "felony 
exception" is not merely an exception to a strict 
chronological grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, but 
rather is based upon a totally separate analysis of the 
conduct's effect, rather than its chronology. Moreover, 
Appellee selects only one of the five specified discipline 
areas for conduct involving judges or justices as an exception 
to the chronological test Appellee advocates. The other four 
areas, Appellee would argue, ar subject to the restriction of 
the time when the conduct occurred. Appellee presumes again 
to rewrite the constitutional mandate. 
Paragraphs (2), (4) and (5) of Article VIII, Section 
13 illustrate the problems which arise through creating 
exceptions to a false chronological jurisdiction test by 
resort to conduct analysis. In addition to conduct amounting 
to a felony, such paragraphs respectively provide that a judge 
or justice may be disciplined for "disability that seriously 
interferes with the performance of judicial duties," and 
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which 
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in judicial office is ipso facto damaging or debilitative to 
the judicial office itself, while same conduct occurring a day 
prior to taking office is not. Such an argument is specious 
on its face, and such a conclusion is without reasonable 
basis. 
Finally, Appellee asserts that since the Judicial 
Conduct Commission determined it did not have jurisdiction in 
this matter, lf[t]his Court may presume that Appellant's 
misconduct is not conduct that would impair his judicial 
function, such as a conviction of a felony or misconduct that 
would bring his judicial office into disrepute." This Court 
need "presume" nothing of the kind. Article VIII, Section 13 
expressly grants to the Supreme Court powers of plenary review 
of all proceedings before Judicial Conduct Commission for 
correctness "as to both law and fact." Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, Section 13. Appellee's inference that the 
Supreme Court is either obligated or should accept without 
review the Judicial Conduct Commission determination of lack 
of jurisdiction is clearly misplaced and without merit. This 
Court is charged with the duty of determining the scope and 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, and neither can nor 
should abdicate this role to the Judicial Conduct Commission 
or to the Bar. 
C. Attorney Influence and Control of Judicial Discipline 
Should be Minimized to Avoid Inherent Conflict. 
8 
Appellant asserts that allowing the Bar to review 
judicial conduct creates inherent conflict by placing judges 
in the untenable position of facing allegations of unfair 
treatment or favoritism by the judge towards attorneys on or 
affiliated with the review panel. Appellee summarily and 
superficially dismisses Appellant's argument as an unavoidable 
conflict since attorneys are presently appointed to both the 
Bar's disciplinary panels and the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
However, the danger posed by such conflicts cannot be so 
superficially rationalized and minimized. 
Such conflicts pose serious and destructive threats 
to the administration of the justice system and public's 
confidence therein. This Court has a charge to safeguard the 
reputation and administration of public confidence in the 
judicial system. Every effort should be made by this Court 
to minimize the occurrence or possibility of such inherent 
conflict, regardless of whether such efforts result in 
complete elimination or merely minimize the risk of conflict. 
While Appellee correctly asserts that attorneys are 
present on both panels, such a blanket assertion fails to 
consider the underlying issue of panel control. It is hardly 
a point of dispute that the Bar screening panel is not only 
comprised principally of attorneys but is a branch of and 
controlled by the Utah State Bar. Consequently, if a Bar 
panel is granted jurisdiction, there is greater actual risk 
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or, at the very least, a increased potential risk of conflict 
and judge-attorney contact, interaction and conflict. 
On the other hand, the Judicial Conduct Commission 
is a constitutionally and statutorily separate entity, 
comprised of two members of the Utah House of Representatives, 
two members of the Utah Senate, two governor-appointed public 
members, as well as three Bar commissioners and one judge. 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27, U.C.A.) The fact that sixty 
percent of the Commission is reserved to public 
representatives or governor appointed non-members of the Bar 
adds immediate advantage and creditability over a panel 
exclusively comprised of attorneys and controlled by the Bar. 
Moreover, the Judicial Conduct Commission exists as an 
independent commission, while the Bar screening panel exists 
as an administrative branch of the State Bar itself. 
It is both reasonable and realistic to believe that 
public confidence will be maximized and inherent conflict 
minimized by a commission independent of the governing arm of 
the state attorneys association and upon which public 
appointed representatives constitute a majority. 
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D. Appelleefs Constitutional Distinctions Are Unfounded. 
Appellee has attempted to distinguish Utah 
constitutional provisions from those of other states who vest 
their Judicial Conduct Commissions with exclusive jurisdiction 
over judiciary members. For instance, Appellant originally 
cited In re Speiser, 445 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1984) for its holding 
that the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission has 
jurisdiction to discipline a judge for acts occurring prior 
to his assumption of judicial office. Appellee has attempted 
to distinguish Speiser by noting that the Florida constitution 
"grants jurisdiction to the Judicial Qualifications Commission 
for conduct occurring during the term of office or otherwise.If 
In re Speiser, 445 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis in 
Appellee's Brief, Page 9). The Utah Constitution, Appellee 
argues, contains no such general provision for review of 
extra-judicial conduct by the commission. 
However, Appelleefs argument identifies a 
distinction without a difference. While th£ Utah constitution 
may not expressly provide for review of extra-judicial conduct 
by the commission, neither does it prohibit such review. 
Rather it states simply that the commission shall investigate 
any "complaints against any justice or judge." Such language 
is without limitation and by its broad terms encompasses at 
least as broad a grant of authority as that found in the 




Appellant acknowledges that courts are not in 
agreement on the issues of jurisdiction over incumbent judges 
for conduct occurring prior to the assumption of judicial 
office. However, Appellant asserts that investiture of 
exclusive jurisdiction with the Judicial Conduct Commission 
best assures maintenance of judiciary reputation and 
confidence, while maximizing avoidance of inherent conflicts. 
Such jurisdictional issues can and should be resolved by 
reference to the express provisions of Article VIII, Section 
13 of the Utah Constitution which unequivocally grants to the 
Judicial Conduct Commission the authority to investigate 
"complaints against justices or judges," without reference to 
chronological limitation. 
Moreover, public confidence and esteem of judicial 
office is more reasonably preserved and protected by an 
independent constitutionally mandated panel comprised of sixty 
percent public officials and governor-appointed persons, 
rather than a panel exclusively comprised of and controlled 
by Utah attorneys. 
Even in the event exclusive jurisdiction is not 
found to exist on the fact of Article VIII, Section 13, 
Appellant asserts that the proper analysis of jurisdiction 
rests upon analysis of the conduct and its relationship upon 
the office, rather than a meaningless chronological line 
12 
drawing. Under such proper analysis, the underlying issues 
raised by the Complaint herein support Judicial Conduct 
Commission jurisdiction. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court determine that jurisdiction in this 
matter rests with the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
DATED this 11th day of June, 1990. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
BY. ^ ^ ^ > ^ 
Michael L. Dowdl^y Esq. 
Stephen K. Christensen, Esq. 
Robert L. Payne, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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437 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
officer for the courts and shall implement the rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council. 1985 
Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established 
which shall investigate and conduct confidential 
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or 
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the 
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repri-
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary 
retirement of any justice or judge for the following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in 
office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a fel-
ony under state or federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial 
duties; 
(4) disability that seriously interfere^ with the per-
formance of judicial duties; or 
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice which brings a judicial office into disrepute. 
Prior to the implementation of any commission or-
der, the supreme court shall review the commission's 
proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may 
also permit the introduction of additional evidence. 
After its review, the supreme court shall, as it finds 
just and proper, issue its order implementing, reject-
ing, or modifying the commission's order. The Legis-
lature by statute shall provide for the composition 
and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission. 
1985 
Sec. 14. [Compensation of justices and judges.] 
The Legislature shall provide for the compensation 
of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and 
judges shall not be diminished during their terms of 
Office. 1985 
Sec. 15. [Mandatory retirement] 
The Legislature may provide standards for the 
mandatory retirement of justices and judges from of-
fice. 1985 
Sec. 16. [Public prosecutors.] 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for 
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the 
name of the State of Utah and shall perform such 
other duties as may be provided by statute. Public 
The Senate shall consist of a me 
exceed twenty-nine in number, an< 
representatives shall never be less 
greater than three times the numt 
Sec. 3. [Renumbered as Section 
cle.] 




1. [Free nonsectarian schools.] 
2. [Defining what shall constitute t 
system.] 
3. [State Board of Education.] 
4. [Control of higher education systi 
Rights; and immunity 
5. [State School Fund and Uniform 
Establishment and ut 
6. [Repealed.] 
7. [Proceeds of land grants consti* 
funds.] 
8. INo religious or partisan tests i 




13. I Renumbered.] 
Section 1. [Free nonsectarian sc 
The Legislature shall provide for th 
and maintenance of the state's educa 
eluding: (a) a public education system 
open to all children of the state; ai 
education system. Both systems sha 
sectarian control. 
Sec. 2. [Defining what shall cons 
lie school system.] 
The public education system shall 
lie elementary and secondary schools 
schools and programs as the Legisla 
nate. The higher education system s 
nnhlir universities and colleges and ^ 
